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VIII World and Asian Markets for Cassava Products 
World trade in cassava products has ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･､＠ rapidly over the last 
three decades rising from about 200 thousand tons ｣ｾｮ＠ product weight) in 
the early 1950's to a peak of 8 4 milhon tons in 1982 The latter 
represents a ｬｾｴｴｬ･＠ less than 207 of total world ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ of cassava a 
very ｳｩｧｮｾｦｩ｣｡ｮｴ＠ ｦｾｧｵｲ･＠ when compared to a commodity like rice where only 
4% of production moves in world trade While the volume traded is sizeable 
by world ｣ｯｭｭｯ､ｾｴｹ＠ standards eg world ｲｾ｣･＠ trade amounts to a little over 
8 million tons the number of countries involved is ｲ･ｬ｡ｴｾｶ･ｬｹ＠ small In 
fact over 904 of trade is accounted for by exports of Thailand to the 
European Community For a commodity trade of such volume this is a 
particularly narrow base 
Trade dominates the cassava economy only of Thailand and in the 
1980-82 period China Trade ｡｣ｨｾ･ｶ･ｳ＠ a more limited importance 
although rarely exceeding 10% of domestic production -- in Indonesia and 
ｾ＠ In all other cassava producing countries ｩｮｴ･ｲｮ｡ｴｩｯｾｬ＠ trade has 
rarely been an option and is currently of only ｭ｡ｲｧｾｮ｡ｬ＠ importance This 
relatively ｵｮｾｱｵ･＠ trade structure ｲ｡ｾｳ･ｳ＠ a number of issues which will be 
explored in this chapter Most importantly the reasons surrounding the 
relatively narrow participation in world cassava trade will be examined 
This analysis will then lead to an evaluation of the potential for 
broadening the import markets for cassava followed by some prognosis for 
increasing the number of exporting countries The discussion will be 
rooted in an historical evaluation of the changing ､･ｴ･ｲｭｾｮ｡ｮｴｳ＠ of 
comparative advantage an approach which will allow some speculation on the 
future role of cassava in world trade in carbohydrate sources 
Protectionism and Substitution ｄ･｣ｬｾｮ･＠ in the World Starch Trade 
World trade in cassava started with starch exports from the Malayan 
peninsula in the mid-1800 s Early trade relied on cassava s advantage as 
a starch source the higher value-added of starch compared to other 
processed cassava products and the proportionately lower freight costs for 
starch compared to dry cassava Starch was the maJor cassava product in 
value terms moved in world cassava trade throughout the present century up 
till the 1960 s The market for starch is ｲ･ｬ｡ｴｾｶ･ｬｹ＠ small in ｣ｯｭｰ｡ｲｾｳｯｮ＠
to trade in wheat or feed grains Moreover while this market exhibited 
moderate growth from the turn of the century to the Second World War there 
has been little growth ｾｮ＠ the post-war period while the grain trade has 
grown at ｨｩｳｴｯｲｾ｣｡ｬｬｹ＠ ｨｾｧｨ＠ rates However underlying these trends ｾｮ＠
starch trade ｾｳ＠ a market structure undergoing ｳｾｧｮｩｦｩ｣｡ｮｴ＠ change 
influenced by shifting comparative advantage dynamic technical change 
rapidly shifting end markets and trade barriers It is in these terms 
that the world market for cassava starch will be analyzed 
Demand for starch is marked by the product s ｶ･ｲｳ｡ｴｾｬｩｴｹ＠ Almost 
ever"l ma]or industry has found a use for starch and as a result the 
process of ｩｮ､ｵｳｴｲｩ｡ｬｾｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ normally coincides with a significant ｾｮ｣ｲ･｡ｳ･＠
in the demand for starch This industrialization affect is partially 
reflected in the ｨｾｳｴｯｲｩ｣｡ｬ＠ ｳ･ｲｾ･ｳ＠ on ｾｭｰｯｲｴｳ＠ of cassava starch over the 
present century At the turn of the century the ｕｮｾｴ･､＠ Kingdom was the 
largest ｾｭｰｯｲｴ･ｲ＠ of cassava and other starches By the 1920 s the ｕｮｾｴ･､＠
States although a major producer of starch itself became the largest 
importer In the late 1970's the U S was overtaken by Japan and in the 
early 1980's Japan was superceded by Taiwan This pattern closely tracks 
the industrialization process characten.zing the world economy over the 
present century 
/ However a possibly more important phenomenon is the eventual decline 
of imports of cassava starch into principal markets This decline in 
imports is not due to any falling off 1.n overall starch consumption ｾｴ＠
1 
rather the substitution of im orted starch by domestically produced starch 
1 Over t1.me this substitution process has een accelerate on t e one hand 
1' by advances in starch chemistry and the ability to chemically modify 
-1 <,_ \ starches thereby making starches more substitutable and on the other 
1¡ hand by techn1.cal change in both maize product1.on and the maize wet 
1 
milling process reducing the unit costs for this starch and making it over 
¡ the post-war per1.od the predominate starch produced 1.n the world Events 
l 1.n the U S played a dominant role in the declining market share of cassava 
and the rising share of maize in world starch consumption The analysis 
thus turns briefly to a consideration of the starch industry 1.n the Un1.ted 
States and the effect this industry has on the world starch market 
By the turn of the century following on the development of a 
successful processing technique in 1842 (Radley 1968) maize was the 
dominant starch produced and consumed in the U S Production of maize 
starch increased from 141 thousand tons in 1904 to 2 27 million tons in 
1982 a sustained annual growth rate of 3 6% over the course of almost 80 
years (Figure 8 1) This growth in product1.on sped up in the 
post-second-world-war period rising to an annual rate of 4 87 between 1954 
and 1977 In this same post-war period exports of maize starch fell while 
imports of cassava starch first increased through to the mid-1960's and 
then fell dramatically to levels not reached since the turn of the century 
(Figure 8 2) A convergence of factors influenced these trends in 
production and trade in maize starch but the driving force was the 
declining real pr1.ce of maize in the U S during the post-war per1.od --
except for a small hiccup in the years from 1972 to 1976 (Figure 8 3) The 
declining price was due to rap1.d technical change 1.n maize product1.on in 
the U S as per hectare yields increased from 2 4 tons 1.n 1950 to 7 6 tons 
in 1986 ｾ＠ The consequences of th1.s were far reaching 1.n its effect on world 
starch production and trade 
In the U S the declining price to the maize starch industry for its 
raw material allowed the industry to expand its markets resist the 
invasion of tradit1.onal markets by synthetic resins and to subst1.tute for 
imported cassava starch The two dom1.nant trends in the U S starch market 
was the expansion of starch use in the eaper and cardboard 1.ndustry (Table 
8 1) and the technical advances in the modification of starch The 
expanding starch use in the paper products industry caused the increas1.ng 
demand for unmod1.fied starches while advances in starch modification and 
the advent of waxy maize allowed import ｳｵ｢ｳｴｩｴｵｴｩｯｾ｡ｮ､＠ __ ｣ｯｮｾｬＮｮｵ･､＠
competitiveness in the other end uses Thus over the post-war period 
unmodified starch maintained its market share while the number of different 
types of modified starch expanded signif1.cantly (Table 8 2) Finally the 
wet-m1.lling industry was able to achieve increasing returns to scale 1.n 
processing as output per plant has expanded rap1.dly over the period 
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TABLE 8 1 United States Utilization of Maize Stareh in Different 
Industries 1918-S8 
lndustry 1918 192S 1927 19S4 19S8 
(%) (%) (%) 0') (!) 
Bakers lS 8 3 3 3 S 2 1 2 4 
Baking Powder 6 4 7 5 7 2 2 5 1 9 
Brewers 7 3 o 1 o 6 7 9 6 3 
Building Materials 1 9 2 S 
Confeetioners 2 4 S 9 4 8 2 4 2 7 
Dealers and Repaekers 4 9 11 2 6 2 2 4 2 3 
Explosives 2 6 4 2 4 4 O S o S 
Jobbers o 9 1 o 
Laminating and Corrugating 4 la 9 la 10 6a ll 3 11 9 
Other Paper Produets 28 9 3S 3 
Laundries 2 8 2 S 2 2 1 S 1 3 
Groeers 22 1 24 2 19 9 8 9 8 7 
Paste Adhesives Dextrine 9 9 4 8 11 7 1 1 o 7 
Textiles 16 3b 19 ob 22 2b 17 1 16 2 
Mise Food User S 6 7 6 6 7 S S 4 1 
Mise Industrial Uses S 1 2 1 
Domestie Utilization (000 t) 281 8 292 2 362 8 813 4 934 3 
Export (000 t) 48 4 9S 2 96 3 37 9 32 8 
Total ｐｲｯ､ｵ･ｴｾｯｮ＠ (000 t) 330 2 387 4 4S9 1 8S1 3 967 1 
a Ineludes other paper produets b lneludes mise industrial uses 
Souree 1918-1927 Yearbook of Agrieulture 1930 U S D A 19S4-S8 
Arthur D Little In e International Market Potential for 
Nigerian Cassava Produets 1963 
TABLE 8 2 United States Production of Modified and Unmodified Maize 
Starch 1954-1979 
Type of Packaging and 
Product 
Not in retail packages 
Unmodified 
Unmodified waxy 
Acid-converted thin-boiling 
ｏｸｩ､ｾｺ･､＠ ｴｨｩｮＭ｢ｯｩｬｾｮｧ＠
Cationic 
Ethylated 
Modified waxy/amioca 
High amylose 
Other modified starch 
Dextrins 
Pregelatinized 
In retail packages 
1954 
(%) 
58 l 
11 S 
S 9 
4 o 
7 9 
4 8 
7 8 
1958 
en 
53 S 
lO S 
7 9 
8 7 
7 3 
4 6 
7 S 
1979 
(%) 
63 o 
3 4 
6 9 
8 l 
2 4 
2 7 
4 3 
o 9 
2 4 
2 9_ 
1 8 
l 2 
Source 1954-58 Arthur D Little Inc International Market Potential 
for Nigerian Cassava Products 1963 1979 Jones S F The 
World Market for Starch and Starch Products with Particular 
Reference to Cassava Starch 1983 
(Table 8 3) Technical dynamism in raw material production in processing 
and in utilization have created exceptional growth in what on the surface 
should appear to be a relatively tradit1onal stable industry 
A more recent outgrowth of this technological dynamism in the maize 
wet milling industry is the rapid growth in_h_igh ｾｲｵ｣ｴｯｳ･＠ corn sweetners 
ｾ＠ The possibly most important dimension to the very rapid growth in 
the HFCS market is the strong interplay between product substitution and 
price policy in an already well established market U S sugar policy in 
the post-war per1od has been directed to maintaining the incomes of 
domestic producers usually against imports from more productive tropical 
producers The rise of the HFCS industry has been due essentially to the 
protection given the domestic sugar market and the falling relative price 
\ 
of maize Qne result has been falling imports of sugar into the U S from 
developing countries but the sa11ent point in the present context is that 
tal'iff policy and product subst1tution have been the dominant elements 
influencing both HFCS production in the US and world trade in starch 
Nevertheless before returning to the world starch market the 
analysis of the U S market for cassava starch will first be completed 
Cassava starch has enjoyed two markets in the U S a speciality market 
where cassava starch is utilized for its particular characteristics and the 
broader starch market where starches from different sources are 
subst1tutable The non-speciality market has changed over time In the 
early part of the century cassava starch was utilized principally for the 
manufacture of adhesives or glue especially for furniture manufacture and 
for envelopes and stamps Wltn-the advent of resin glue and natural gums 
_these markets disappeared to be replaced in the 1950's by the ｾ＠
Industry where cassava starch was used as a corrugating adhesive These 
represented large markets where other starches could have substituted and 
cassava starch was used because of its competitive price In 1928 the 
e i f price of Javanese cassava starch in New York was $2 31 per 100 
pounds compared to a maize starch price in Chicago of $3 25 per IDO pounds 
(Comm1ttee on Finance U S Senate 1929) Thai cassava starch was very 
competitive with domestically produced maize starch through the 1950 s 
The cassava starch rnarket share increased from 3 6% in 1952 to 14 1% in 
1961 (Arthur D Little. Inc , 1963) By-1968 cassava starch had ceased to 
ｾｯｭｰ･ｴｩｴｩｶ［＠ /in the broader industrial market and imports declined 
dramatically - Cassava starch has maintained its speciality market in 
the food industry but at a relatively insignificant level of around 30 
thousand tons The largest import market for cassava starch over the 
course of about 50 years declined to relative insignificance 
Responsibility for this dramatic shift in cassava starch imports lies 
partly with the technological advance taking place in the maize industry 
and partly with the changing international price for cassava During the 
1960 s the linkage between international ma1ze and cassava prices was 
severed by the creation of the European Economic Community (see the next 
Not co1ncidentally 1968 is the year when a tariff hole was opened for 
cassava feedstuffs in the EEC This topic will be discussed in the 
next section 
TABLE 8 3 United States Number of Starch Factories and Average Starch 
Production 1933-82 
Number of Factories Starch Production Average 
More than 20 Production 
Year Total Employees Total Maize Per Plant 
(000 t) (000 t) (t) 
1933 28 n a 462 8 435 6 16 529 
1937 27 n a 456 3 424 6 16 899 
1947 55 21 776 6 734 4 14 120 
1963 60 20 1 270 3 1 163 5 21 172 
1972 39 27 1 711 8 1 627 6 43 892 
1977 39 27 2 602 6 2 488 6 66 967 
1982 41 26 2 475 4 2 270 4 60 376 
Source Biennial Census of Manufactures U S Department of Commerce 
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section for details) The 1960 s witnessed the rise of the dr1ed cassava 
animal feed trade where cassava chip or pellet prices were linked to the 
interna! grain prices of the EEC and not to the international grain market 
Post-war growth in cassava starch trade was halted and throughout the 
1960 s and 1970 s world exports of cassava starch remained stagnant at 
around 200 thousand tons However stagnation did not turn into decline as 
there was a major restructuring of import markets 
This restructuring had two principal components the rise of new 
import markets in Asia and the transfer of ma1ze wet milling technology to 
maJor markets usually through investment by the Corn Products Corporat1on 
of the USA By far the more important element in th1s restructuring was 
the development 1n maJor markets of a domest1c capacity to produce maize 
starch usually based on imported maize This displacement of starch 
production based on domestic sources such as rice potato and wheat by 
starch production based on imported maize occurred essentially in the 
post-war per1od Several factors spawned this development 1n particular 
the declining real price of maize in intemational markets the cost 
savings 1n bulk shipping of grains -- to the extent that starch became more 
expensive to ship than grains -- the very high tariff barriers in most 
markets for imported starch generally much lower tariffs on imported maize 
in order to support the growing animal feed sector the technical advances 
1n the maize wet milling process and the high value of the sub-products 
especially the oil and gluten Thus maize starch became the principal 
starch produced in the U K all five countries in the original EEC Spain 
and Japan and at the same time maize starch exports from the U S declined 
to 1nsignificant levels In 1980 out of an estimated world production of 
starch of 16 million tons maize starch accounted for 77% (Jones 1983) 
Cassava must move in international trade in a processed form and 
therefore cassava must buck the post-war trend in internat1onal 
agricultura! trade where bulk movement of raw materials has dominated 
Cassava starch has been one casoalty of these developments trends that 
have been set in motion by technical change and agricultura! trade 
policies This however has not prevented cassava starch from carving out 
new markets essentially by minimizing transport costs and by breach1ng 
trade barriers These new markets have come in Asia and the importance of 
transport costs in the development of these markets can be seen in Table 
8 4 
Japan developed as a maJor importer of cassava starch in the 1970 s 
but 1mported cassava starch was always of secondary importance in domest1c 
markets because of trade restrictions Japan erected a relat1vely 
elaborate set of import restrictions designed on the one hand to protect 
domestic raw material producers especially sweet potato and potato 
farmers and on the other hand to meet the needs of a growing domestic 
starch market Starch production in Japan increased from 895 thousand tons 
in 1962 to 1 975 thousand tons in 1982 to become the world s second 
largest starch producer Whereas in 1962 sweet potato and potato starch 
accounted for over ＸＰｾ＠ of total production (Business and Defense Serv1ces 
Administrat1on 1967) by 1982 the production share had fallen to 207 In 
TABLE 8 4 Ocean Freight Rates for Cassava Starch from Thailand 
December 1980 
Percentage of 
Bangkok fob 
Destination Freight Rate price a 
Ta1wan 
Indonesia 
Japan 
25 
25 
30 
($/t) (%) 
+ 10 
+ 10 
+ 12 
Western European ports 75 (Non-conference) + 29 
USA b 
Notes a 
b 
Source 
110 (Conference) + 42 
lOO (Non-conference) + 38 
120 (Conference) + 46 
Bangkok fob price in December 1980 was $260 per ton 
Freight rates to west coast port destinations are 
slightly cheaper than to east coast destinations 
Jones S F The World Market for Starch and Starch 
Products w1th Particular Reference to Cassava Starch 
1983 
this period in which the production of sweet potato starch fell the 
production share of maize starch increased from 9 3% in 1962 to 76% in 1982 
(Figure 8 4) Even though maize used in starch production comes under the 
quota and tan.ff system maize starch has come to dominate the domestic 
market Part of the reason is that the major use for starch in Japan is 
for sweetner production where maize wet-milling technology is well 
advanced this accounted for 57!. of total consumption in 1978/79 (Jones 
1983) 
The cassava starch that is imported services partly a speciality 
market and partly those industries where cassava starch is subJect to quota 
rather than a 25% ad valorem duty (see Jones 1983 for a detailed 
discussion of the Japanese trade protection system for starch) Thus 
cassava starch was able to take advantage of the rapid growth in the 
Japanese starch market but cassava starch only filled in at the margin 
Without trade liberalization there is little scope for a large role for 
cassava starch in the Japanese market even though imports will fluctuate 
to a certain extent depending on the import price as happened in 1984 when 
Thai export prices declined markedly 
However rapid industrialization 1n the countries of the Pacific rim 
have generated new markets for cassava starch In 1980 Taiwan became the 
largest importer of cassava starch Imports increased from an average of 
around 10 thousand tons in the 1973-76 period to over 100 thousand tons in 
1981-84 This was due to falling domestic product1on especially for 
cassava starch and rapidly rising demand Imports went from 4% of 
domestic consumption in 1975 to 52% in 1980 (Jones 1983) The only 
dynamic component in the domest1c starch sector was maize starch where 
production increased from 17 thousand tons in 1975 to 45 thousand tons in 
1980 (Jones 1983) However one factor has limited the growth of the 
maize starch industry and that is a domestic sugar industry This has 
forestalled movement to an integrated starch-sweetner technology while 
market size has limited scale economies in processing On the other hand 
tariffs on imported maize of 3% are much more favorable than the tar1ff of 
Taiwan $1500 per ton on cassava starch -- a rate of about 16/. on 1980 cif 
prices The future for cassava starch importa into Taiwan h1nges on 
developments in the domestic maize starch sector and here domestic sugar 
production and scale econom1es will probably be the driving forces 
The market analysis above provides sufficient reasons for the 
stagnation at around 200 thousand tons in the world trade in cassava starch 
over the course of the 1960's and 1970 s What then is surprising is the 
very significant expansion in export volumes 1n the 1981-84 period In 
1984 Thai exports of cassava starch reached an historical high for any 
country of 465 thousand tons The U S S R suddenly entered the market in 
1982 importing very large volumes of cassava starch Singapore also 
became an importer of some substance and Hong Kong has continued to import 
about 10 thousand tons However most interesting of all is that Indonesia 
imported almost 100 thousand tons in 1982 and over 50 thousand tons in 
1983 while Malaysia came into the market for over 10 thousand tons in 
1984 All of these are essentially Asian markets and Malaysia and 
Indonesia are as well major producers of cassava starch A major 
devaluation of the Thai baht in 1981 and part1cularly low root pr1ces in 
1981 and 1984 partly prec1pitated by the Thailand-EC quota agreement made 
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Thai cassava starch especially competitkve kn regional markets This 
kncreased Japanese and Takwanese imports and made Thak starch competitkve 
with domestkcally produced starch in Malaysia and Indonesia Supply side 
factors thus also have an kmpact on the world market and the analysis 
thus turns to a brief summary of export trends 
Historically exports of cassava starch have usually been dominated by 
a single country except in relatively brief periods of transitkon between 
countries Comparative advantage in cassava starch productkon has shifted 
quickly and dominance is virtually total Thus comparative advantage 
shifted from Malaysia to Indonesia in the period 1907 to 1913 and from 
Indonesia to Thailand during the Second World War (Table 8 S) The fkrst 
transition was precipitated by the rubber boom in Malaya while the second 
came as a result of the ravages of the war and the demkse of the colonkal 
regime in Indoneska There were thus clear reasons behind the rapidity of 
the transition period but what is less clear is why Skngle countries should 
dominate in world cassava starch trade 
A maJor part of the reason for thks dominance is the relatkvely small 
size of the world market and the inherent riskiness in scalkng up an 
export-oriented industry in such a thin market In both transitkons the 
precipitating cause of decline in the leading country was a loss of 
profitability in the production of cassava starch In Malaysia chis was 
due to the rising opportunity cost of land due to the expanding rubber 
industry and kn Indonesia it was due to the destruction of processkng 
capacity and the demise of the plantation systems of Java where land costs 
under a colonial administrator dkd not reflect its true scarcity value On 
the other side in the expanding countries growth in investment in 
processing and in turn increased cassava production had to be motivated by 
a significantly large profit margin This knitkal establishment phase was 
usually based on a period of relatively high world prices and some factor 
which made cassava production particularly competitive i e some basks for 
comparative advantage In the case of Indonesia the basis of comparative 
advantage was a substancial and relatively cheap labor force a plentkful 
water supply knternational capital availability relatively liberal terms 
for plantat1on development in upland areas and an existing smallholder 
production base However the initial base for comparatkve advantage was 
re1nforced over time by development of excess processing capacity (and 
therefore qukcker supply response) establkshed marketkng channels and a 
research capacity for developkng new technologies Consohdation of the 
cassava starch export industry made entry by other countrkes into this 
market virtually kmpossible 
Comparative advantage is thus not JUSt a matter of intrknSkC factors 
which make a country partkcularly competitive If export dominance can be 
established further evolution in the industry tends to reinforce 
comparative advantage That is comparatkve advantage kn internatkonal 
trade can be created and does not necessarily depend only on initial factor 
endowments To a very skgnkfkcant extent Thailand created its particular 
comparative advantage in the production of cassava starch and later cassava 
pellets This was based on the development of a major road system 
especially into the Northeast a relatively lkberal land polkcy together 
with an unexplokted frontker an indkgenous engkneerkng capacity so that 
starch processing factories could be manufactured locally an existing 
well-developed export sector based on rkce and commerckal mkddlemen with 
the capital to invest Thailand had exported cassava starch as early as 
the 1930's but it was not till the demise of Indonesian exports that the 
Thai cassava starch industry began to expand under the impetus of high 
prices following the Second World War By the mid-1950 s Thailand was 
unchallenged in the world cassava starch market and by the 1980's both 
Malaysia and Indonesia were importing cassava starch from Thailand 
The cassava starch industry in Thailand faces two princl.pal 
constraints on further expansion both of which are due to trade policies 
of other countries The first is the high tariff barriera for starch in 
practically all maJor import markets except the U S Since cassava starch 
moves in world trade in a starch form rather than as a raw material 
differential trade barriera have resulted in cassava starch not being able 
to take advantage of the relatively buoyant growth in demand for starch 
whereas maize has captured much of the market Moreover the only other 
exports of starch of any significance is potato starch from the 
Netherlands Potato starch has diffJ.culty competing with maize starch 
within the EC and substantial subsidies are necessary to export these 
surpluses Annual exports from the EC of about 150 thousand tons further 
decrease the international market for cassava starch A polJ.cy constrained 
market very much characterizes world trade in cassava starch even though 
some price elasticity does exist as is characteristic of a product with 
such close substitutes 
This demand elasticJ.ty is closely linked to the second constraint In 
Thailand the starch industry must compete with the pellet export market for 
cassava roots Because prices for pellets are defined by interna! EC gral.n 
prices the chip and pellet industry makes the price of roots significantly 
more expensJ.ve than if the industry had to compete at world maize prl.ces 
which the starch industry must do The starch industry usually comes into 
the root market during the rainy period when root prices are low and root 
demand from the pellet industry is also low As root prices rJ.se the 
starch industry is usually caught in a price squeeze and often must cease 
operation Significant excess capacity normally exists in the industry 
Thus when root prices are low starch producers can significantly expand 
their market by lowering prices and because of the excess processing 
capacity output response can be significant With the low root prices 
caused by the quota in the early 1980 s the Thai starch J.ndustry was able 
to double its exports (Table 8 6) Thailand is often constrained in 
expanding its starch market by the particular policy context of cassava 
within the EC however for Thailand this is not a loss sJ.nce the social 
profits for selling pellets in the EC market more than compensate for the 
loss of starch sales 
Future prospects for world trade l.n starch are if anything 
unpredictable No studies predicted nor could have predicted the rapl.d 
expansion in cassava starch trade in the 1980 1 s after two decades of 
stagnation sJ.nce it was principally due to the imposition of the quota 
Policies are the dominant influence on world trade l.n cassava starch and 
these have tended to remain outside the real of economic predictJ.on The 
only feature that l.S clear is that Thailand will continue to dominate 
exports for the foreseable future and the prospects for any other country 
entering the market at any substantive volume are m1nimal 
TABLE 8 S 
d Period 
1900-04 
1905-09 
1910-14 
1915-19 
1920-24 
1925-29 
1930-34 
1935-39 
1940-44 
1945-49 
1950-54 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
1975-79 
1980-84 
a 
a World Exports of Cassava Starch Flake and Pearl 1900-1984 
Indonesia Malaysia b Thailand Brazil Madagascar 
(t) (t) (t) (t) (t) 
11 607 52 807 - 154 -
33 525 46 347 - 256 -
49 754 37 589 - 383 814 
67 684 41 759 - 4 327 2 577 
84 040 29 166 - 1 688 2 249 
127 701 27 245 - 394 3 193 
113 539 27 398 1 789c 527 S 330 
178 955 17 302 1 49Sc 1 549 12 936 
na S 399 n a S 715 9 698 
2 523 8 611 n a 17 942 8 618 
11 422 4 384 21 329 21 953 9 621 
2 004 6 944 88 275 20 145 9 081 
2 843 20 608 157 903 17 206 7 249 
819 19 425 155 413 15 225 5477 
2 490 23 132 171 143 17 131 4 058 
1 410 16 253 188 305 4 726 2 194 
2 434 1 079 355 090 n a n a 
Reunion Indochina and French West Africa 
Togo 
(t) 
-
-
-
-
-
-
102 
608 
731 
4 127 
2 558 
4 426 
S 064 
2 692 
n a 
neg 
neg 
b Excludes minor exporters such as 
Before 1920 exports are from the 
These figures are net exports 
Straits Settlements and after 1955 does not include Singapore 
e Imports from Siam by Malaysia d 
Average yearly exports in the period 
Source CIAT data files 
Total 
(t) 
64 568 
80 128 
88 540 
116 347 
117 143 
158 533 
148 685 
212 845 
n a 
n a 
71 267 
130 875 
210 873 
199 051 
217 954 
212 888 
358 603 _.....--
TABLE 8 6 
Period 
1955-59 
1960-64 
1965-69 
1970-74 
1975-79 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Source 
Cassava Starch Exports form Thailand and Imports by 
Principal Countries 
Exports Imports 
Thailand USA Japan Ta1.wan 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) 
88 3 77 1 6 
157 9 116 9 8 4 
155 4 126 2 38 8 
171 1 75 9 71 9 11 7 
188 3 37 4 81 5 34 1 
243 6 27 9 67 3 87 3 
308 1 36 3 79 1 108 9 
387 1 29 7 82 1 102 5 
363 5 28 6 59 7 89 3 
464 9 37 4 136 9 146 6 
497 4 36 S 162 o 146 9 
Individual country foreign trade statistics 
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The world starch market is really something of an allegory for the 
history of cassava The lessons are essentially two First rarely if 
ever have there been policy interventions by domestic governments in their 
cassava producing sectors On the other hand policy interventions by 
importing countries either directly on imported cassava or ｾｮ､ｩｲ･｣ｴｬｹ＠ on 
domestic ｳｵ｢ｳｴｾｴｵｴ･ｳ＠ have continually influenced cassava s trade prospects 
Second prior to the Second World War cassava products were very 
competitive ｷｾｴｨ＠ grain products even ｣ｯｮｳｩ､･ｲｾｮｧ＠ the relatively high cost 
of international shipping The basic change between the pre-war and 
post-war position of cassava has been the rapid technical change in grain 
ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ in temperate developed countries especially the U S The 
relative shift in comparative advantage between tropical cassava and 
temperate grains has been due to very large differences in research 
expenditures on grains versus cassava Every allegory has its moral and 
cassava s continued role in international trade is ｴ･ｳｴｾｭｯｮｹ＠ to its 
inherent productivity Second modern comparative advantage especially of 
tropical cassava versus temperate grains is not fixed in stone but will 
depend essentially on technical progress together with economies of scale 
of post-harvest ｨ｡ｮ､ｬｾｮｧ＠ and processing 
Protectionism and Substitution The Rise in Trade in Cassava Feedstuffs 
Apart from Thailand and Malaysia cassava starch production has 
normally been a component of a wider cassava sector where the bulk of the 
production normally went to food uses In many cases these were dry 
products such as gaplek in Indonesia or farinha de mandioca in Brazil 
Prior to the early 1960's surpluses of these products were often exported 
principally to be used as an animal feedstuff in European countries 
Volumes in this century prior to 1960 were never large only rarely 
exceeding 200 thousand tons in a single year By comparison the 
ｾｮｴ･ｲｮ｡ｴｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ maize trade was normally around 4 to 6 million tons during 
this period having reached a peak of 13 million tons in 1937 
Ｈｉｮｴ･ｲｮ｡ｴｾｯｮ｡ｬ＠ Institute of Agriculture) Argentina and Eastern Europe 
were the main ｳｵｰｰｬｾ･ｲｳ＠ of maize in this period International transport 
costs and the more rudimentary state of balanced feed technology limited 
the development of a ｷｾ､･ｲ＠ trade in cassava feedstuffs 
The current large trade ｾｮ＠ cassava pellets was essentially 
policy-induced The origin of ｴｨｾｳ＠ trade was German price policy in the 
1950's Western Europe in the immediate post-war ｰ･ｲｾｯ､＠ was the principal 
market for feedgrain ｾｭｰｯｲｴｳ＠ Germany however developed a policy of ｨｾｧｨ＠
､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ grain prices to support the income of its own farmers (Figure 
8 5) The ｲ｡ｰｾ､ｬｹ＠ expanding animal feed sector however had significant 
incentive to try develop cheaper supplies of carbohydrate sources with 
cassava being a potential grain substitute German companies in the 1950 s 
began developing supply sources in ｉｮ､ｯｮ･ｳｾ｡＠ and Thailand German ｾｭｰｯｲｴｳ＠
of cassava in 1955 were 131 thousand tons ｾｮ＠ 1959 import levels were 240 
thousand tons and in 1960 323 thousand tons The year 1960 marked the 
ｰｯｾｮｴ＠ at which Germany turned from Indonesia to ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ as a principal 
source of supply During this period the other European ｣ｯｵｮｴｲｾ･ｳ＠ were 
relatively minar importers of cassava 
The formation of the European Economic Community and its ｡ｳｳｯ｣ｾ｡ｴ･､＠
Common Agricultural ｐｯｬｾ｣ｹ＠ served to expand the market that German policy 
TABEL 8 7 European Community Threshold Prices for Grains During the 
Unification Process 
Grain and 
Country 
Bar ley 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Belgium 
Maize 
Germany 
Netherlands 
Belg1Um 
July 1965 
(U A /100 kg) 
103 87 
88 95 
84 00 
103 87 
84 67 
78 20 
July 1966 
(U A /100 kg) 
103 87 
88 95 
84 00 
103 87 
87 15 
78 20 
July 1967 
(U A /100 kg) 
89 00 
89 00 
89 00 
88 38 
88 38 
88 38 
July 1968 
(U A /100 kg) 
95 00 
95 00 
95 00 
94 38 
94 38 
94 38 
Source International Trade Centre UNCTAD/GATT Markets for Manioc as a 
Raw Material for Compound Animal Feedingstuffs 1968 
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and German companies had developed The first stage come in July 1962 when 
the variable levy and support price system become effective for all 
feedgrains The agricultura! common market rested on two prices The 
1ntervention price is the guaranteed minimum price for farmers at wh1ch 
marketing agencies throughout the E E e are comm1tted to buy the grain 
The threshold pr1ce is the m1n1mum pr1ce at which grain imports from 
non-E E e countries enter the community The variable levy is the 
d1fference between the threshold price and the current e i f import price 
Internal prices are thus insulated from world market prices and operate 
within a band between the floor or intervent1on price and the ceiling or 
threshold price Br1ng1ng all internal pr1ces within the economic 
commun1ty into line was done gradually and it was not unt1l July 1967 that 
all national intervent1on and threshold prices were unified and border 
taxes were abolished 
During this process cassava was not overlooked but nevertheless was 
treated differently Initially in 1962 only cassava meal imports were 
subJect to tariffs These cons1sted of a fixed component and a var1able 
component based on the barley variable levy After var1ous changes by 
November 1964 the meal levy was fixed at 25 percent of the barley levy plus 
2 S units of account (the European eommunity accounting un1t) per ton (see 
Nelson 1982 for further detail) In July 1967 chips and pellets were 
brought under tariff regulation and these products faced a variable levy of 
18/ of the barley variable levy and no fixed charge The meal tariff 
remained the same The most important change however carne in July 1968 
when as part of Kennedy Round of the GATT negot1ations the levy on 
cassava pellets and chips was bound to a maximum 6-' ad valorem bas1s 
eassava meal was not bound and cont1nued to be subject to-;he higher duty 
The pattern and trends in cassava imports were remarkably sens1tive to 
these policy changes First the form in which cassava was 1mported 
changed with the differential duty structure Meal was the principal form 
of imports prior to 1962 With the slightly h1gher duty structure for 
meal growth in imports in the 1962-68 period shifted to chips even though 
chips are bulkier and more costly to transport Meal was eliminated as an 
import 1tem in 1968 due to the change in tariff structure and w1th the 
investment security provided by the duty b1nding the imports of cassava 
shifted almost completely to pellets to take advantage of economies in 
transport 
Germany remained the dominant importer of cassava up to 196 7 The 
unification of pr1ces however shifted profitabil1ty of cassava imports to 
the Netherlands and Belgium Unification resulted in grain prices 1n 
Germany com1ng down and those in the Netherlands and Belgium r1sing 
(Table 8 7) This reduced cassava s relative profitab1lity 1n Germany and 
increased it 1n the Netherlands and Belgium (Table 8 8) As grain prices 
were the same across countr1es transport costs became a determining factor 
of which areas could most successfully bid for cassava imports As 
Rotterdam had by far the most efficient unloading and d1stribution system 
the Netherlands became the locus of cassava imports Thus 1n 1966 Germany 
imported 702 thousand tons of cassava compared to only 96 thousand tons for 
the Netherlands Germany did not reach that level of imports aga1n unt1l 
1977 By that time the Netherlands was 1mporting 1 8 million tons 
ＨＧｾＧ｡｢ｬ･＠ 8 9) 
TAllCE 8 8 European Ccmmmity Canparison Beu-m Barley and Cassava Prices Dur:!ng the Unification Process 
ｾｴ･ｭ｢･ｲ＠ 1966 S tember 1967 
Product and e i t Jmport Threshold Cassava Prlce Cif Jmport Threshold Cassava Price 
Coontry Price Duty Price Bar ley Prlce Price Duty Price Barley Price 
(U A /100kg) (U A / HXJKg) (U A /100kg) {:'') (U A /100kg) (U A /100kg) (U A /100kg) (%) 
Germany 
Bar ley 62 25 42 20 104 50 - 59 65 30 65 89 ()() 
Cassava <hlps 75 60 272 78 32 74 9 61 60 5 52 67 12 75 4 
Cassava Pellet 78 40 2 82 81 22 77 7 64 40 5 52 69 92 78 6 
Cassava Meal 70 ()() 13 05 83 05 79 5 56()() 8 02 64 02 71 9 
Netherlands 
Bar ley 61 13 28 34 89 64 - 59 65 30 65 89 ()() 
Cassava <hlps 75 60 272 78 32 87 4 61 60 5 52 67 12 75 4 
Cassava Pellets 78 40 2 82 81 22 906 6440 5 52 69 92 78 6 
Cassava Meal 70 00 9 59 79 59 889 56()() 8 02 64 02 719 
ｂ･ｾ＠
Bar ley 61 24 22 80 8400 - 59 65 30 65 89 ()() 
Cassava <hlps 75 60 272 78 32 93 2 61 60 5 52 67 12 75 4 
Csssava Pellets 78 40 2 82 81 22 96 7 64 40 5 52 69 92 78 6 
Cassava Meal 70 ()() 8 20 78 20 93 1 56()() 8 02 64 02 719 
Soorce Intemational Trade Centre UNCfAD/GlíiT 'Markets for Manioc as a Raw Material for Canpourul An:lnal Feedingstuffs 1968 
'OO!LE 8 9 Furopean Ccmrunity Net Iutx>rts of Cassava Pellets Chips and Meal 1960-1985 
Urúted 
Year Nether 1ands Genrany France Belgium Italy Dernmrk K:lngdan Ireland Total 
(CXXlt) (OOOt) (CXXlt) (CXXlt) (CXXlt) (CXXlt) (CXXlt) (CXXlt) (OOOt) 
1960 4 1 322 8 27 1 444 5 - 7 - 399 6 
1961 6 6 357 1 26 4 868 8 
- 1 2 - 479 o 
1962 1 2 366 1 23 6 229 neg - 2 - 414 1 
1963 4 8 387 3 20 o 721 - - a - 484 2 
1964 16 9 461 5 18 5 105 4 - - a - 602 3 
1965 76 5 519 6 18 o 100 5 6 - a - 715 2 
1966 95 7 701 7 16 6 70 7 20 
- a - 8868 
1967 158 8 532 7 19 6 113 3 1 2 - a - 825 7 
1968 234 3 4800 14 4 123 4 1 5 
- a - 853 7 
1969 424 9 548 1 14 8 209 5 3 9 - a - 1 201 1 
1970 475 8 587 4 11 1 267 3 1 4 neg o 2 - 1 343 o 
1971 510 9 522 o 39 o 273 2 2 o neg o 1 - 1 347 2 
1972 670 4 429 2 140 o 290 8 1 3 neg o 1 - 1 531 9 
1973 756 6 331 3 159 o 188 9 o 2 os neg neg 1 436 6 
1974 1 067 8 429 4 164 3 3814 o 7 3 6 23 7 neg 2 070 9 
1975 1 200 4 483 5 146 5 4418 - - o 3 neg 2 272 S 
1976 1 541 1 660 2 175 1 552 8 12 9 7 9 7 1 1 9 2 959 1 
1977 1 823 8 920 4 2010 672 9 neg 53 2 6 6 15 o 3 693 o 
1978 2 293 1 1 409 7 713 4 863 1 219 2 127 3 134 804 5 719 4 
1979 2 001 8 1 463 1 567 6 714 2 189 8 82 2 22 2 42 8 5 083 7 
1980 2 158 5 1 336 5 364 9 620 9 98 9 545 28 1 39 9 4 702 2 
1981 2 401 5 1 547 6 680 4 841 2 237 o 91 2 4018 307 6 231 2 
1982 2 827 4 1 993 9 786 6 1 029 9 212 2 57 6 798 6 804 7 786 6 
1983 1 121 5 1 796 7 239 8 906 3 997 o 9 314 3 47 5 4 526 7 
1984 2 432 1 1 830 8 263 6 799 5 108 o 5 o 126 3 18 8 S 584 1 
1985 2 982 o 1 674 6 307 o 801 6 108 7 o 4 770 50 8 6 002 1 
a Cassava not broken out as separate item in these years 
Source ElJROSTAT Foreign Trade Analytical Tables {NIMEXF) and foreign trade statistics of individual countries 
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Unification of grain prices however became difficult to mainta1n 
with realignment of exchange rates of member countries As grain prices 
were specif1ed for a 12 month period 1n un1ts of account (UA) any exchange 
rate adJustment vis-a-vis the UA would cause grain prices to d1verge 
Price unification became particularly difficult with the floating exchange 
rates adopted in the early 1970 s Thus with the realignment of the franc 
and mark in 1969 green exchange rates -- that exchange rate at which 
common prices are established -- and border taxes (MCA's) were instituted 
in order to manage CAP administrative prices The result of these pol1cies 
was that member countries grain prices began to diverge again that is when 
evaluated in dollar terms at market exchange rates This differentially 
affects demand for cassava in the individual countr1es since each country 
faces a single market price for cassava but in relation to different grain 
prices (see Nelson 1983 for a discussion of this po1nt) 
The CAP completely changed the dynamics of animal production in 
Western Europe Growth in animal populations occurred in those areas with 
the cheapest feed sources and these are precisely the areas which have 
transport advantages in the import of those feedgrain substitutes that do 
not come under the variable levy The process was extraordinarily rap1d 
and was especially pronounced in the swine industry Between 1965 and 
1970 swine populations increased 59% in the Netherlands and 103% 1n 
Belgium compared to only 16% in Germany and 21% in France (Table 8 10) 
In the period 1970 to 1985 the swine population increased 103/ in the 
Netherlands and only 19% in Germany and actually declined in France These 
trends are correlated with the use of grains in compound feeds Overall 
the proportional use of cereals in balanced feeds has declined 1n the EEC 
but especially in the Netherlands Cereal use in compound feeds in that 
country has dropped below 20% (Table 8 11) whereas worldwide the f1gure is 
closer to 60% 
Cereal substitutes are essent1ally imported and the princ1pal one is 
cassava Cassava imports into the EEC over the past two decades and a half 
have shown dramatic growth increasing from 400 thousand tons in 1960 to a 
high of 7 8 mill1on tons in 1982 (Table 8 9) Every country 1n the EEC 
imports cassava but the Netherlands is by far the largest 1mporter 
Cassava importa by West Germany remained relatively stagnant until 1976 at 
which point 1mports more than doubled in two years In 1975 nat1onal grain 
prices 1n West Germany finally recovered to their pre-1967 level From 
that point national prices continued to rise The mark in 1976 also 
started to appreciate rapidly against the dollar and the 1nternational 
price (in marks) of cassava declined significantly in 1977 and 1978 This 
made cassava very attractive in Germany again and imports increased 
markedly 
The basic rationale beh1nd the Common Agricultura! Policy was that the 
European consumer would bear the principal costs of the h1gher prices paid 
to farmers Moreover EEC consumers as well paid the cost of the h1gher 
prices of cereal substitutes even though they were not subJect to the 
variable levy cereal substitutes garnered h1gher prices in the EEC grain 
market and these higher prices were transferred to exporting countries as 
social profits above what could have been earned on the world market 
'levertheless cereal subst1tutes did not add to the EEC s tax revenue 
account and budgetary outlays by the EEC government for the costs of 1ts 
TABLE 8 lO 
Year 
1960 
1965 
1970 
1975 
1980 
1985 
European Community Evolution of Growth in the Swine 
Population 1960-1985 
Germany France Netherlands Belgium 
(000) (000) (000) (000) 
15 787 8 603 2 934 l 579 
17 723 9 238 3 987 l 885 
20 532 ll 215 6 340 3 966 
19 805 ll 890 7 016 4 679 
22 553 ll 963 lO 186 S 011 
24 360 lO 956 12 908 5 521 
Source EUROSTAT AnLmal Production 
EEC-9 
(000) 
69 584 
68 663 
77 293 
80 983 
ThBLE 8 11 furopean Camunity Raw MaterlBl Used in CarqJound Feeds 1978 
Oilseed cakes Com gluten 
Cereals Cassava and ueals feed Other Total 
Country (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) (OOOt) (%) 
West Gennany 4 506 303 900 6 1 4900 33 o 670 4 5 3 876 26 1 14 852 100 
Nether l1mds 2 470 18 3 1 904 14 1 2 349 17 4 1 152 8 6 5 597 41 5 13 472 lOO 
Belgl.um 1 724 35 1 618 12 6 1 055 21 5 o o 1 518 309 4 915 100 
United K1ngdan 5 578 49 4 o o 1 377 12 2 o o 4 336 384 11 287 lOO 
France 5 862 44 1 710 5 3 2 500 18 8 200 1 5 4 028 303 13300 lOO 
Camunitytotal 27 643 380 4 557 6 3 15 793 21 7 1 717 2 4 22 961 31 6 72 671 lOO 
Scurce Falcon et al 'The Cassava Econany of Java 1984 
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grain policy started to increase ｳｾｧｮｩｦｩ｣｡ｮｴｬｹ＠ in the early 1980 s In 
that period the EEC became a net exporter of grains the dallar started to 
｡ｰｰｲ･｣ｾ｡ｴ･＠ against European currencies making the domestic costs of export 
subsidies high and cassava importa reached record high levels in 1981 and 
1982 The budgetary costs of the CAP grain policy started to reach levels 
that were putting strains on the capacity of the EEC to generate tax 
revenue 
Cassava started to play a significant role in the ability of the CAP 
to sustain its objectives In an econometric model of the EEC feedgrain 
market Rastegari (1982) found that cassava imports and consumption had a 
positive impact on livestock ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ -- thereby confirming the previous 
analysis -- and had a negative impact on feedgrain imports The latter 
effect is expected and resulta in the loss of tariff revenues to the EEC 
treasury The more significant ｦｾｮ､ｩｮｧ＠ was that cassava imports had a 
negative effect on the setting of threshold prices Cassava imports were 
reducing the flexibility of the EC to set domestic farm ｰｲｾ｣･ｳ＠ especially 
when the EC moved into a net export position in grains where export 
subsidies were large and dumping developed political repercussions with 
traditional grain exporters especially the U S 
The EEC was under significant pressure to reduce the growth in 
budgetary costs of the CAP without the political flexibility of 
legislating majar structural reform ｾｮ＠ agricultura! policy The EEC sought 
to resolve the situation by ｲ･､ｵ｣ｾｮｧ＠ the growth in imports of cassava 
Because the 6% ad valorem import duty on cassava was bound in the GATT the 
EEC sought to--negotiate voluntary export restraints ｷｾｴｨ＠ ｰｲｩｮ｣ｾｰ｡ｬ＠
supplying countries especially Thaüand The EEC found this to be the 
politically most tractable solution since unbinding of the tariff would 
have required agreement of compensation with exporting countries with which 
the binding had been negotiated and with the country (if different) which 
is the majar ｳｵｰｰｬｾ･ｲ＠ Moreover all the EEC countries would as well have 
had to agree to the ｵｮ｢ｩｮ､ｾｮｧ＠ In November 1980 Thailand agreed in 
principle to the voluntary limitation of cassava exports to the EEC 
however it is not ｴｾｬｬ＠ September 1982 that the voluntary export restraint 
agreement was ratified by both ｰ｡ｲｴｾ･ｳ＠
Thailand felt that she had little bargaining power at ｴｨｾｳ＠ stage She 
had already negotiated a quota agreement for textile exports to the EEC an 
industry in which investments had been large and which was a principal 
component of her ｩｮ､ｵｳｴｲｩ｡ｬｾｺ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ strategy Moreover ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ ､ｾ､＠ not 
want to put a ｰｯｬｩｴｾ｣｡ｬｬｹ＠ sensitive industry such as cassava (because of 
its importance as a source of farm income ｾｮ＠ the Northeast) at ｲｾｳｫ＠ by 
relying only on the difficulty of EEC members ｲ･｡｣ｨｾｮｧ＠ agreement among 
themselves on an unbinding of the duty In addition Thailand was promised 
a ｳｾｧｮｩｦｩ｣｡ｮｴ＠ increase in agricultura! development aid to be spent on 
cassava diversification in the Northeast Finally as Blyth (1984) has 
shown in another context from the exporters viewpoint voluntary export 
restraints are the least harmful form of ｰｲｯｶｩ､ｾｮｧ＠ protection against 
imports into the EEC Weighing the options Thailand chose the less risky 
course However as Britain s Overseas Development Institute observed 
The story combines all those elements which so often bring the CAP into 
disrepute ｭｾｳ､ｩｲ･｣ｴ･､＠ public expend1ture (in this case of aid money) 
insensitive protectionism and ｵｮ｣ｲｾｴｩ｣｡ｬ＠ acceptance of the views of 
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European farming intereses at the expense of consumers (in this case other 
farmers) and overseas suppliers (House of Lords 1981) 
As a concession to Thailand the EEC also comm1tted 1tself to 
mainta1ning Thailand' s position in the European cassava market The EEC 
thus sought voluntary export restraints from other principal exporting 
countries In 1982 an agreement also was reached with Indonesia and 
Brazil who were then GATT members which unbound the tariff and replaced 
it with a tariff-quota The agreement for all parties concerned was 
limited to a five-year period (Table 8 12) Thailand was part1cularly 
disadvantaged in the agreement by being the only country whose export quota 
would decline over time Also in the initial understanding the EEC would 
also bear in mind the importance of imports of carbohydrate products which 
would compete directly with manioc (House of Lords 1982) Significantly 
the other cereal substitutes of importance were maize-gluten feed and 
citrus pulp pellets the principal supplier of which was the United States 
The EEC has not found it possible politically to restrain the imports of 
these produces and during the quota period imports of maize gluten feed 
rose dramatically This situation underscores a basic point about the 
political economy of cassava which is that cassava's vested intereses have 
always lain with the economically powerless 
Before the end of 1986 the EEC and the principal cassava exporters 
i e Thailand had to come to terms on a new agreement or return to the 
situation prevailing before 1982 By late 1986 Thailand and the EEC had 
both ratified a new agreement on export controls of cassava The agreement 
covers four years from 1986 through 1989 and specifies a maximum export 
volume of 21 million tons over the period This amounts to S 2S million 
tons a year some improvement on the 4 S million ton quota of 198S-86 
However exports to Portugal and Spain as well would now come under the 
agreement Some minor flexibihty was allowed in distributing the quota 
from year to year as Thailand could export up to S S million tons in any 
single year This pattern of periodic deliberation and renewal of a new 
agreement on export restraint will most l1kely continue to be the pattern 
of EEC-Thailand trade in cassava 
Demand for Cassava in the EEC With the voluntary export restra1nts 
1n place since 1982 estimation of import demand for cassava is something 
of a moot point at least as far as total quantity imported by the EEC is 
concerned However price and the distr1bution of those imports w1thin the 
EEC does have an effect on the profits to be earned by the Tha1 cassava 
industry and the comparative cost of animal feed across EEC countries How 
prices for cassava are determined thus is of key importance to Tha1land 
especially in its management of the restra1nts on exports to the EEC 
The feed industry in Europe is highly competitive and factories base 
their purchas1ng decis1ons on least-cost feed formulation models In 
general cassava will enter into swine rations first that is at h1gher 
cassava prices than its entry into poultry rations A large feed 
manufacturer in the Netherlands in 198S maintained a 40% maximum 
1ncorporation level for swine rations and a 2S/ inclus1on maximum for 
poultry rations McK1nzie et al (1986) cite max1mum inclusion levels of 
3Sk in swine rations and 20k for poultry rations for Dutch feed 
manufacturera in 1980 With1n any individual country cassava demand is a 
TABLE 8 12 
Year 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
Source EEC 
Export Restraint Agreement on Cassava Negotiated between the 
EEC and Principal Trading Countries 1982-86 
Other GATT Other Third 
Thailand Indonesia Members Contr1es 
(OOOt) (OOOt) (OOOt) (OOOt) 
5000 500 90 370 
5000 750 132 370 
5000 750 132 370 
4500 825 146 370 
4500 825 146 J70 
Council Regulation No 2646/82 30 September 1982 
TABl..E 8 13 European Cumminity Estimates of Price Dependent Cassava 
Demand Equations 
Netherlands Germany 
Standard Standard 
Variable Coefficient Deviation Coefficient Deviation 
Intercept o 74 1 88 -2 99 3 os 
Cereal Price o 85 o 23 o 31 o 10 
Soybean Meal Price -0 03 o 06 o 03 o 04 
Swine Population -0 03 o 27 o 54 o 31 
Net Imports -0 03 o 01 -0 02 o 008 
Quota Dummy o os o 07 o 07 o 47 
R2 o 21 o 14 
Note The dependent variable was the spot price for cassava in Rotterdam 
and Hamburg The cereal price was maize in the Netherlands and 
barley in Germany Data were monthly observations 1973-1984 Equa-
tions were estimated in double-log form corrected for second order 
autocorrelation 
SOURCE CIAT 
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step function operating between the price when ｾｴ＠ first enters the swine 
ration to that price at which cassava reaches maximum incorporation levels 
in all rations Because internal grain prices vary between countries 
cassava will be utilized ｦｾｲｳｴ＠ in those ｣ｯｵｮｴｲｾ･ｳ＠ with relatively high 
grain prices As Nelson (1983) points out cassava demand will be 
relatively elastic in these countries between the price at which it first 
enters the ration and the maximum incorporation rate For additional 
imports demand becomes less ･ｬ｡ｳｴｾ｣＠ as the cost of transporting cassava 
from the port increases and it must compete in ｲ･ｧｾｯｮｳ＠ where feed-grain 
prices have been lowered by green rates 
The import demand function for cassava is fraught ｷｾｴｨ＠ difficulties in 
specification Given a short enough time period so that supply cannot 
respond demand theory would suggest a price dependent ｦｵｮ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ Moreover 
ｳｾｮ｣･＠ grain ｰｲｾ｣･ｳ＠ vary between countries a market clearing price for 
cassava will be defined ｾｮ＠ each of the major importing countries with some 
potential for arbitrage between neighboring countries Using monthly data 
price dependent import demand ｦｵｮ｣ｴｾｯｮｳ＠ were estimated for the Netherlands 
and Western Germany with the internal cassava price ｢･ｾｮｧ＠ a function of 
the market price for the dominant feedgrain net imports of cassava the 
soybean meal price and the swine population 
The results of this estimation (Table 8 13) show that cassava prices 
respond to changes in feedgrain prices As would be expected cassava 
prices are more responsive to changes in maize prices in the Netherlands 
the ｭ｡ｾｮ＠ importer than to barley prices in Germany However although 
cassava imports have a significant and negative effect on cassava prices in 
both countries the sue of the coefficient is remarkably close to zero 
suggesting very little elasticity in the market This result is 
counterintuitive given the rapid rate of growth in cassava imports and the 
ease of substitution in feed componente ｍ｣ｋｩｮｺｾ･＠ et al (1986) estimate 
a demand ･ｬ｡ｳｴｾ｣ｩｴｹ＠ for cassava in the Netherlands of -2 4 using 
transformad solutions of least-cost feed models It is therefore 
ｷｯｲｴｨｷｨｾｬ･＠ to analyze more closely the mechanisms surrounding price 
formation of cassava 
Cassava prices are quoted in Europe in Deutsch marks on an fob 
Rotterdam basis which ｾｳ＠ ､ｾｳｴｩｮ｣ｴ＠ from the cif Rotterdam quotes for other 
｣ｯｭｭｯ､ｩｴｾ･ｳ＠ such as soybean meal The difference is the point at which the 
buyer takes ownership of the commodity In the case of soybean meal it is 
purchased on the Chicago Board of Trade and the feed manufacturer pays the 
freight and insurance at the unloading point in Rotterdam In the case of 
cassava he buys on a customs cleared basis from the shipper in Rotterdam 
The shipper pays the freight and ｾｮｳｵｲ｡ｮ｣･＠ discharge costs and customs 
duties The ｳｨｾｰｰ･ｲ＠ has ｯｷｮ･ｲｳｨｾｰ＠ of the cassava till ､ｾｳ｣ｨ｡ｲｧ･＠ ｾｮ＠
Rotterdam while in the case of soybean meal he does not providing only 
freight services 
The reason feed manufacturera have gone to ｴｨｾｳ＠ system was essentially 
the uncertainty of quality and customs clearance At one stage Thai 
pelleters were ｾｮｴｲｯ､ｵ｣ｾｮｧ＠ rice hulls which under EC ｴ｡ｲｾｦｦ＠ rules would be 
classified as a compound feed dutiable at a very high tariff Under the 
current system the shipper guarantees the quality and the price and the 
buyer assumes no risks However this system potentially reduces the 
efficiency of pr1ce transmission between the two markets 
This last point is reflected in the determination of a market price 
for cassava in Europe Most buyers purchase cassava on forward contracts 
so that continuity of supplies is guaranteed and storage costs are kept to 
a minimum In general cassava 1s contracted between 2 to 6 months forward 
Thus approximately 90% of each shipment from Thailand has already been 
contracted Only a small percentage is sold on a spot market or at the 
so-called afloat price the price normally quoted from trade sources 
Moreover the afloat pr1ce generally reflects speculators in the market who 
have not yet covered their contracta and is therefore more variable than 
the forward price 
The market price for cassava is therefore a negotiated forward pr1ce 
between shipper and feed concentrate manufacturer and this price is often 
not quoted The shippers can negotiate on the basis of known production 
costs for pellets in Thailand known handling and freight cost -- in 1985 
$4/t for loading $9/t for freight and insurance and $5/t for discharge --
and the tariff while the buyers will negotiate on the basis of the shadow 
price of cassava in their feed cost models and their sense of the cassava 
price in Thailand and Europe 
The analysis of price transmission between Thaiiand and Europe (see 
Chapter VII) suggested that forward prices in Europe were much better 
correlated with Thai prices than afloat prices and that prices were 
transmitted instantaneously with some residual tendency for prices in 
Thailand to lead those in Europe before the quota and those in Europe to 
lead Thailand after the quota The forward contracting and the nature of 
price transmission suggests that the cassava price is given exogenously 
--in the context of a monthly import demand equation--and thus the 
endogenous variable in the demand function should be cassava imports 
An import demand equation was thus estimated using net cassava imports 
as the dependent variable Since th1s is an amount which is forward 
contracted traders have suggested that an average period is about three 
months and so imports were lagged three months Lagged imports were then 
made a function of the forward price for delivery in three months current 
swine stocks current soybean meal pr1ces and the grain threshold pr1ce 
three months forward Since grain prices are fixed on a monthly basis 
before the crop year the threshold price is the best estimate of the 
future gra1n price Because a fixed amount of cassava must be allocated 
among the various countries the equations were estimated us1ng Zellner's 
seemingly unrelated regression technique 
The results (Table 8 14) are significantly better than the previous 
specif1cation The direct import elasticity is relatively elastic 
although lower for the Netherlands than for Germany This is expected in a 
country where cassava imports already are 30% of the combined product1on of 
pig and poultry feeds and moving add1tional amounts involves more radical 
price changes Conversely cassava importa in the Netherlands respond much 
more strongly to changes in grain prices than in Germany In Germany a 
large part of the concentrate and animal industry is in the South and 
cassava use 1n rations in th1s part of the country is moderated by the 
TABLE 8 14 European Commun1ty Estimates of Import Dependent Cassava 
Demand Equations 
Netherlands Germany 
Standard Standard 
Variable Coefficient Deviation Coefficient Deviation 
Intercept 3 08 3 74 -65 1 8 35 
Cassava Price -1 49 o 32 -0 90 o 31 
Cereal Price 1 87 o 64 2 77 o 58 
Soybean Meal Price o 26 o 29 o 54 o 26 
Swine Population o 61 o 61 6 69 o 87 
Quota Dummy -o 60 o 16 -0 06 o 12 
R2 o 33 o 55 
Own Price Elasticity o 71 1 15 
Cross Price Elasticity 
with Cereals o 65 o 36 
Note The cassava and cereal pr1ces were three month forward prices and 
imports were lagged three months Zellner s Seemingly Unrelated 
Regression procedure was used to estimate the coeffcients 
Source CIAT 
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transport costs from port areas Grain prices have to move more radically 
to get the same response in demand for cassava imports Finally the quota 
is principally affecting cassava use in the Netherlands where cassava 
imports have declined other things being equal to what they were prior to 
the quota Why Netherlands should be worse affected than Germany by the 
quota is not clear and in the end is counterintuitive However this 
result may be short term in nature since in 1985 the Netherlands recovered 
in import volume what it lost ｾｮ＠ 1983 and 1984 This result may therefore 
reflect forward contract committments at the time of ｾｭｰｬ･ｭ･ｮｴ｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ of the 
quota 
The soybean meal coefficient remains something of an anomally since 
it suggests that cassava and oilseed meals are substitutes particularly ｾｮ＠
Germany where the coefficient is ｳｩｧｮｾｦｩ｣｡ｮｴ＠ ｍｩｳｳｰ･｣ｩｦｾ｣｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ is 
possible ｳｾｮ｣･＠ the current price rather than the future price was used 
a future price in Europe was not available Nevertheless Nelson (1983) in 
bis model of EEC import demand did not get a significant ｣ｯ･ｦｦｾ｣ｩ･ｮｴ＠ for 
soybean meal either though the sign suggested complementarity McKinzie 
et al (1986) working with least cost feed models in the Netherlands find 
a complementary relationship between cassava and oilseed meals 
Nevertheless even using such a robust technique the cross-price 
elasticity estimated is only -0 3 i e there is a response of cassava use 
to changes in oilseed meal prices but ｾｴ＠ is not large In Germany ｯｾｬｳ･･､＠
meals make up 30 to 40% of feed concentrates Because oilseed meals are 
often similarly priced to grains they enter as a calorie as well as a 
protein source Changes in oilseed meal prices would thus have little 
influence on cassava use since the protein restrictions in the least cost 
models are already more than met 
The effects of the quota thus have been (1) to reduce the efficiency 
of price transmission between Europe and Thailand while shifting cassava 
price formation essentially to demand-side factors in Europe (2) to widen 
the margins between Europe and Thailand a factor which Thailand is using 
to open third-country markets and {3) to reallocate cassava imports 
between countries On the latter point Spal.n and Portugal s entry into 
the EEC the suggested elimination of green rates and MCA s and the 
environmental constraints being placed on expansion of livestock 
enterprises l.n northern Europe all suggest potentJ.al for shiftJ.ng the 
locus of growth J.n an1mal production to these two countries ｾｦ＠ based on 
the ｡｢ｩｬｾｴｹ＠ to efficiently import feed componente whJ.ch do not come under 
the variable levy Given grain shortfalls in both these countries rJ.sing 
grain prices as the grain sector comes under CAP prices some experJ.ence 
with importl.ng cassava in 1984 and 1985 and the prOJected improvement in 
port facill.tl.es condJ.tions seem appropriate for such a restructurl.ng 
Moreover the quota on cassava imports will probably have little 
impact on increased grain use Hillberg (1986) developed a simulation 
model of the West German feed sector and found only gradual substitution of 
grains for cassava in swine and poultry ratJ.ons in northern Germany 
However the quota also led to higher feed prices a decreased demand for 
feed concentrates and in consequence the impact of changes l.n ration 
composJ.tion favoring grains was dampened by the accompanying hJ.gher 
finished ｲ｡ｴｾｯｮ＠ costs (Hillberg 1986) Moreover as McKinzie et al 
(1986) find the high cross-price elasticities suggest that a specific 
commodity ｾｭｰｯｲｴ＠ restriction would substantially reduce that commodity' s 
TABLE 8 1S Asia Per Capita Chicken Meat and Pork Consumption Trends 
in Selected Countries 196S-1982 
Country 196S 1970 197S 1980 1982 
(kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) (kg) 
Non-Cassava Producing 
Japan 
Chicken 1 6 3 8 S 2 7 7 7 7 
Por k 3 1 4 7 6 S 9 6 9 6 
Taiwan 
Chicken 2 o S 6 8 4 12 3 13 3 
Por k 16 8 18 o 17 S 26 2 2S 4 
South Korea 
Chicken O S 1 4 1 6 2 3 2 S 
Por k 2 o 2 6 2 8 6 3 6 o 
Cassava Producing Countries 
ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠
Chicken n a n a 3 3 S 9 7 2 
Por k n a 4 9 S 1 7 8 n a 
Philippines 
Chicken n a 2 S 3 1 3 2 3 4 
Por k n a 8 1 9 o 8 S 9 1 
Malaysia 
Chicken n a 6 8 9 2 10 3 10 3 
Por k n a S 9 4 9 S O S 4 
Indonesia 
Chicken n a o 3 o S 1 1 1 3 
Por k n a o 3 o 4 o 4 o 4 
useage but that use of other non-grain importa could be expected to rise 
greatly Such appears to be the case with corn gluten feed imports from 
the Un1ted States (Siamwalla 1986) 
The world market for cassava feedstuffs is something of the reverse of 
that for cassava starch In the case of feedstuffs tariff and price 
policies in Europe have created a large market insulated from world trade 
conditions in feedgrains Since the market is politically defined (though 
almost every agricultura! market has its political dimension) cassava' s 
impingement on other EEC objectives has resulted in restraints on future 
growth of EEC importa The European market is nevertheless providing the 
base for the restructuring of trade in cassava pellets and to understand 
this process requires some analysis of the feed and livestock sector in 
East Asia 
The Asian Regional Market for Cassava Feedstuffs 
Do cassava feedstuffs have a w1der international market than just the 
European Community ? Trade and price policies as in all trade matters 
dealing with cassava hold the key to the answer The issue is being 
forced by the EC itself through its imposition of import quotas which in 
turn has caused Thailand to devise mechanisms to open third country 
markets The solution mimics the EEC' s export subsidies with one big 
difference the European consumer rather than the EEC budget is in effect 
subsidizing Thai exports to non-EC countries Th1s is irony of a high 
order that the EEC should be subsidizing Thai cassava exports to third 
countries This outcome is to the international grain trade what epicycles 
were to Ptolemaic astronomy a further complication to produce a workeable 
system but where the central thesis of that system is faulty For cassava 
what it achieves is time to develop a more rational system and the bulwark 
of such a system will inevitably be the Asian market for feedstuffs which 
is currently dominated by imports of U S coarse grains 
Food consumption patterns in East and Southeast Asia are changing 
rapidly The causes for these changes arise as much from the supply side 
-- technical change in food production and processing improved foreign 
exchange availabilities allowing an increase in and diversification of food 
1mports and improvements in marketing -- as from the demand side --
increasing per cap1ta incomes urbanization declining influence of 
religious prohibitions on certain foods and changing relative pr1ces 
Changing food consumption patterns are thus set within an evolving economic 
system which reflects fundamental structural change and basic shifts in 
food processing marketing home preparation methods and purchasing 
patterns as the population shifts from rural to urban residence 
The most fundamental shift in food consumption patterns in Asia has 
been the rapid increase in the consumption of l1vestock products 
especially meat (Table 8 15) For example in Japan 1n the two decades 
spanning the period 1960 to 1980 per capita consumption of beef grew at an 
annual rate of S 6% pork at a rate of 11 14 and chicken at a susta1ned 
rate of 16 7% Even after such high rates of growth per capita meat 
consumption in Japan is still only about a quarter of levels in the United 
States This 'nghlights the first salient feature of meat consumption 
patterns in Asia that growth in consumpt1on has started from a very small 
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base since for most countries no more than 5 O kg of meat per person was 
consumed Ln the early 1960's Only the PhilLppLnes and Taiwan would appear 
to have had a higher consumpt1on base due essentially to the larger role 
of swine in farming systems and rural consumpt1on patterns Pigs also were 
important Ln large parts of China Swine have played a differential role 
across Asian countries in definLng meat consumpt1on patterns partly 
because of relig1ous restrict1ons such as Moslem taboos in Malays1a and 
Indonesia and Buddh1st prejudices in Thailand and Japan and partly because 
of feed availability on farms in swine producing countries usually the 
root crops sweet potatoes or cassava and rice millings 
In the two decades encompassing 1960 to 1980 annual growth in per 
capita GNP was over 47 in all countries under study here except for the 
Philippines which grew at 2 8% per year Meat demand is very income 
elastic in As1a (Table 8 16) and yet income elasticities and income growth 
do not explain all the growth in per capita meat consumpt1on In Asia 
income growth has also precipitated diversification of the diet as 
reflected in the very low per capita consumption f1gures for meat in the 
early 1960's Also income growth 1s closely related to other bas1c changes 
1n the economy that affect food consumption patterns particularly 
urbanization and the growth of food reta1ling networks Implic1t in 
migration from a rural to urban setting is a shift in food sources from one 
based primar1ly on production to one based on purchases Also conven1ence 
becomes an important factor in food choice in preparat1on methods and 1n 
food storage in the home Finally food preferences become more 
susceptible to advertising and to the diversity found in eat1ng out of the 
home Therefore implicit in income growth are the basic changes in 
lifestyle that imp1nge on food consumpt1on patterns these have had a large 
impact on the rising demand for meat in Asian countries 
Income elasticit1es do not vary sign1f1cantly across the different 
meats except for the lower estimates for pork in the high consuming 
countries Income growth does not account for the very signif1cant 
d1fferences in growth rates between the d1fferent meats Thus wh1le 
income expla1ns much of the growth in total meat consumption price is the 
more relevant variable 1n analyzing growth rates in indiv1dual meats In 
all meats the own-price elastLcity is very high and whüe cross-price 
elastLc1ties are normally s1gnificant (Table 8 17) substitution has not 
yet played a dom1nant role in meat consumption patterns in Asia as it has 
for example 1n Latin America Differences in growth rates in consumption 
of the various meats is due to the differentLal trends in real prices of 
the meats especLally the declLne in chicken and to a certa1n extent pork 
prices vis-a-vLs stabilLty or increases Ln the price level of beef It is 
the fundamental effect of prices on meat consumpt1on that makes bas1c cost 
changes on the supply side so Lmportant 
Japan has the longest hLstory in the modernizat1on of 1ts feed and 
livestock industry and thus in many respects will presage the future 
developments 1n the lLvestock industry of many Asian countrLes The 
dominant factor in the expansion of the livestock sector 1n Japan was 
technical change This is shown in Table 8 18 which shows rap1d expansion 
1n meat production of ch1cken and pork even though product prices were 
declining relat1ve to feed prices This relationship 1s the more 
impress1ve considering that feed makes up 35/ of pork product1on costs and 
about two th1rds of chicken productLon costs (Coyle 1983) Three 
TABLE 8 16 Asia Income Elasticities for Meats 
Country Por k Chicken Beef 
Non-Cassava Producing 
Taiwan 39 1 10 97 
Japan 1 02 1 64 1 09 
South Korea 1 19 1 54 1 38 
Cassava Producing 
Philippines 85 1 00 80 
Thailand 58 44 41 
Indonesia 1 4 2 2 n a 
Source Wu Cho Sawada ASEAN Prusarn Monteverde 
TABLE 8 17 Asia Own Price Elasticities of Meats 
Country Por k Chicken Beef 
Non-Cassava Pr-oducing 
Taiwan 44 55 -1 99 
Japan -2 os -1 25 -1 53 
South Korea -1 53 -1 64 -1 34 
Cassava Producing 
Phihppines 
Urban -2 00 -1 30 -1 30 
Rural -1 so -1 00 
Source Wu Cho Kester ASEAN 
ｾｭｰｯｲｴ｡ｮｴ＠
efficiency 
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changes account for these rapid increases in production 
changes that are now occurring in other Asian countries 
ｆｾｲｳｴ＠ structural change in livestock ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ has been rapid 
Production has moved from small units on farms to specialized large-scale 
･ｮｴ･ｲｰｲｾｳ･ｳ＠ In Japan this process has been particularly ｾｭｰｲ･ｳｳｩｶ･＠ in 
both swine and broiler production (Table 8 19) Structural change in 
livestock production has not implied a gradual increase in animal 
populations on farms but a rapid shift away from farm units to specialized 
production units In the process the number of producers declined rapidly 
In Japan the number of swine producers declined from 800 thousand in 1960 
to 156 thousand in 1979 (Coyle 1983) ｓｴ｡ｴｩｳｴｾ｣ｳ＠ on total animal 
populations usually mask quite marked shifts in sources of production 
Thus in disaggregating the statistics for Thailand for poultry (Table 
7 25) while growth in the total population has been moderate the increase 
in large-scale commercial operations has been very rapid and on-farm 
populations have declined 
This search for scale economics through structural change has 
characterized the pork and poultry sectors of all the countries under study 
here except Indonesia and China In China the very rapid rise in pork 
production and ｣ｯｮｳｵｭｰｴｾｯｮ＠ since the political changes of the late 1970's 
has been due to shifts of production from collectives to individual 
households and ｩｮｴ･ｮｳｾｦｩ｣｡ｴｩｯｮ＠ of ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ through the improved 
availability of grains (Sicular 1985) In Indonesia on the other hand 
income distributional obJ ectives have been translated into a 1983 poli e y 
which limits the size of poultry operations to a thousand layers and 750 
broilers (see World Bank 1984 for a more extensive discussion of the 
policy) This policy may limit the price declines in poultry that have 
come in other countries and therefore the expansion in consumption On the 
other hand ｳｾｮ｣･＠ the population is still overwhelmingly rural the policy 
may in fact lead to decentralization of production away from urban areas 
and increased rural consumption as is occurring with pork in China The 
feed companies appear willing to respond by developing rural feed 
､ｾｳｴｲｩ｢ｵｴｩｯｮ＠ channels Indonesia and China may offer an alternative 
livestock development strategy oriented towards rural consumption 
However eventually when the policy turns toward urban consumption the 
development of large-scale poultry and swine units will be essential to 
cost and price reductions for urban consumers 
The second important change in livestock systems in Asia is the shift 
to balanced feeds as the principal source of animal nutrition The impact 
of this on production efficiency has come through improved animal 
nutrition which has allowed quicker weight gains usually higher slaughter 
weight and improved reproductive capacity Whether balanced feed is 
cheaper than on-farm feed sources is questionable especially for swJ.ne 
since feedstuffs with relatively low opportunity costs are used Mixed 
feeds however allow balanced nutrition especially for protein 
requirements and expand the availability of feed sources which are 
usually constrained at the farm-level Development of a mixed feed 
industry has been especially critica! in the growth of the poultry 
industry 
Development of a mixed feed industry usually leads the structural 
change in livestock production with the initial linkages generally being 
TABTE 8 18 Japan Trends in Meat Production and Meat-Feed Price Ratios 1960-79 
Beef and Vea! Chicken Por k 
Annual Annual Annual 
Annual Change in Annual Change in Annual Change in 
Production Meat-Feed Production Meat-Feed Production Meat Feed 
Period Growth Ratio Growth Ratio Growth Ratio 
(%) (7) (%) (%) (7) (%) 
1960-6S 6 1 n a 36 o n a 20 9 3 6 
196S-70 6 9 S 4 19 8 - 2 6 12 4 - o 7 
1970-7S 4 3 2 9 8 4 - 3 o S 2 2 6 
197S-79 S 2 S 8 9 6 - 2 9 13 2 - 4 9 
1960-79 S 6 4 6 18 4 - 1 o 12 8 o 2 
Source Coy le William Japan s Feed-Livestock Economy 1983 
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made with the poultry sector Growth in compound feed manufacture has been 
very rapid in East and Southeast Asia in the last one to two decades Most 
countries have managed annual growth rates of well over 107 with Japan 
maJ.ntaining a 9 9% annual rate of growth over a period of 22 years from 
1960 to 1982 (Table 8 20) Growth can be remarkably rapid in the early 
stages in the establl.shment of the industry Thus in the 1960's Japan's 
compound feed industry grew at annual rate of 17h comparable to the growth 
of South Korea's industry in the 1970 s of 18% but well below the 
remarkable growth in Thailand of 30/ per annum through the course of the 
1970's 
There is a chicken or egg questl.on in the gestation of a compound feed 
industry In most cases the establishment of the industry is based on the 
development of commercial poultry enterprl.ses Wl.th the two often 
vertically linked in the initial phases The feed industry often assumes 
the inJ.tiative in the development of its market If developments in the 
J.ndustry follow the example of Japan then eventually divestment of the 
poultry enterprises takes place and diversificatJ.on occurs with a 
significant rise in swine feed and dairy feed production However 
significant differences will be expected to occur across countries in the 
development of the latter two industries because of Moslem prohibl.tions of 
pork consumption l.n Malaysia and Indonesia and lactose indigestability in 
many Asian populations In Asia more so than any other continent the 
development of the livestock industry is and will be based on either the 
purchase of mixed feeds by livestock producers or the purchase of the feed 
ingredients by the livestock producers to mix their own feeds Expansion 
of the livestock industry in Asia will not be based on an l.ntegrated farm 
system l.n which own production of feed components is ll.nked to livestock 
production 
The third element responsJ.ble for rapid technical change in the 
livestock sector is the improved feed conversion rates in the animal 
population This is due to both more efficient animal breeds and 
improvements in management especJ.ally in animal health A particular 
trend in swl.ne production is the movement away from breeds with a hJ.gh fat 
carcass to those with a much higher percentage of lean meat However 
aggregate feed conversion rates only partially reflect this improvement 
since they as well incorporare the movement away from on-farm feed 
resources -- that is those feed components which do not usually figure J.n 
data on feed avaJ.lability -- to compound feeds (Table 8 21) Aggregate 
feed conversJ.on rates thus first J.ncrease and then decline when the 
conversion by livestock producers to compound feed has stabilized 
Comparison of these aggregate rates across countries will not differentiate 
between improvements in the efficiency of feed conversion and the degree of 
penetratJ.on of compound feeds in the livestock sector What the limited 
data in Table 8 21 indicate is that aggregate feed conversion rates are 
still rising in all countries but Japan that l.S the changes in the 
production structure of animal production is stJ.ll the dominate J.nfluence 
Rising demand for livestock products and the structural change in 
livestock production have created a very rapl.d increase in the derived 
demand for feedstuffs especJ.ally carbohydrate sources The response to 
this situation l.n all cases but Thailand has been to increase l.mports of 
feed grains In the non-cassava and non-maize producing countries the 
growth in feed grain imports has been very rapid J.ndeed In 1960 Japan 
TABLE 8 19 Japan Structural Change in Average Herd 
or Flock Size 1960-79 
Period Swine Broilers Layers 
---------
animals per farro 
---------
1960-65 4 o n a 25 9 
1965-70 9 7 1 852 8 62 2 
1970-76 23 3 S 101 o 186 6 
1975-79 46 4 10 081 o 492 1 
1979 60 7 12 684 o 670 3 
Source Coy ele 1983 
TABLE 8 20 Asia Production of Compound Animal Feeds in Selected 
Countries 1970-83 
Non-Cassava Producing Cassava Producing 
Year Japan South Korea Thailand Philippines Malaysia 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) 
1960 2 884 n a n a na n a 
1970 15 097 508 109 4 314 4 236 7 
1975 16 897 901 486 5 654 7 315 6 
1976 18 671 1382 666 4 625 3 389 8 
1977 19 948 1899 725 5 830 o 386 2 
1978 21 210 2693 922 8 960 o 444 8 
1979 22 796 3880 1 173 9 994 o 457 3 
1980 22 292 3462 1 350 o 1 061 o 548 6 
1981 22 173 3491 1 560 o 1 147 o 564 6 
1982 22 896 4420 1 710 o 1 161 o 569 2 
1983 n a 5852 1 962 o 1 061 o 636 2 
Source Statistics of feed associations and government agencies 
TABLE 8 21 Asia Feed ｃｯｮｶ･ｲｳｾｯｮ＠ Rates (kg of feed per ene kg of meat) 
for Seleeted Countries 1970-80 
Meat and 
Year Japan 
(kg) 
Swine 
1970 5 36 
1975 4 36 
1980 4 34 
Poultry 
1970 2 07 
1975 3 13 
1980 2 90 
Beef 
1970 4 18 
1975 5 61 
1980 8 08 
a 
b 
e 
Poultry meat and eggs 
Grain only 
Commereial produetion only 
South Korea ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠ e China b 
(kg) (kg) (kg) 
n a 3 85 n a 
2 40 n a n a 
3 27 n a 4 o 
a 2 55 2 55 n a 
3 79 a n a n a 
5 51 a 2 o n a 
n a n a 
o 43 n a 
2 41 6 o 
Souree Coyle 1983 Dyek and Sillers 1986 Chesley 1985 Sieular 1985 
TABLE 8 22 Southeast Asia Trends in Production and Trade of Maize 1960-84 
Thailand Philippines Indonesia Malaysia 
Year Production Net Exports Production Net Exports Production Net Exports Production Net Exports 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) (000 t) 
1960 544 515 1210 14 2460 n a 4 -120 
1965 1021 804 1380 - 6 2283 5 9 - 53 
1970 1938 1371 2005 - 1 2606 282 16 -212 
1975 2863 2072 2767 -121 2903 50 14 -275 
1976 2675 2388 2843 - 96 2572 - 51 26 -269 
1977 1677 1518 2855 -148 3143 1 18 -288 
1978 2791 1955 3167 -105 4029 - 5 12 -310 
1979 2863 1988 3123 - 35 3605 - 63 8 -436 
1980 2988 2175 3110 -250 3994 - 19 8 -430 
1981 3449 2549 3290 -253 4509 4 8 -400 
1982 3002 2800 3126 -341 3234 -193 9 -683 
1983 3552 2630 3134 -528 5087 - 33 20 -775 
1984 4226 3117 3439 -182 5288 100 22 -953 
Source National production and trade statistics 
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Taiwan and South Korea together imported less than 2 million tons of coarse 
grains By 1984 the import level for these three countries stood at 27 6 
million tons Domestic production of feedstuffs in these countries 
declined during the period especially barley 1n Japan sweet potatoes and 
barley in South Korea and cassava and sweet potatoes in Taiwan which 
thereby reinforced the linkage between domest1c livestock production and 
feed grain 1mports Decline in domestic production of feedstuffs in these 
countries was due to the demise of integrated livestock-crop farms and the 
rising costs of farm labor as a result of industrialization and rural-urban 
migration 
In ma1ze-producing countries however development of the livestock 
sector has been one of the factors stimulating increases in grain 
production Thus in the Philippines Indonesia Thailand and China 
feedgrain product1on has increased significantly (Table 8 22) but this has 
not been sufficient to keep up with rising demand except 1n the case of 
Thailand The Philippines moved from the position of net exporter or m1nor 
net importer of maize to a major net 1mporter in 1971 Indonesia did the 
some in 1976 and China has significantly increased its imports in the last 
five years Finally Thailand has not been able to increase significantly 
its maize exports even through domestic production has increased from 2 3 
m1llion tons in 1973 to well over 4 million tons in 1984 In all countries 
feed demand has increased at a much more rapid pace than domestic 
production of feedstuffs Significant scope therefore exists in the 
tropical countries in Southeast Asia to link increasing interna! demand to 
production growth in feedstuffs thereby improving farmer income in 
principally upland areas 
The rapidly rising demand for carbohydrate sources for the growing 
animal feedstuff industry in East and Southeast Asia thus raises a dual 
potential for cassava that is exports from Thailand to the large import 
markets in Japan South Korea and Taiwan and increased domestic utilization 
in the cassava producing countries As regards the former the quota 
placed by the EEC on cassava imports has had the secondary affect of 
shifting Thai surpluses into principally East Asian markets The mechanism 
by which this has been accomplished has to do with Thailand s interna! 
management of the quota on the one hand and liberalization of tariff 
barriers on cassava for animal feed by the princ1pal importing countries in 
East Asia 
Since the agreement between Thailand and the EEC restricting cassava 
flows to Europe 1s a voluntary export restraint Thailand had to accept the 
responsibility for managing the quota (as Blyth 1984 has shown voluntary 
export restraints are the least harmful form of protection from the 
exporter's view point) Since the agreement which covers the period 1982 
to 1986 was not s1gned t1ll September of 1982 only 1n 1983 did Tha1land 
begin to effectively lim1t cassava exports to the EEC During 1983 the 
Min1stry of Commerce in Thailand adopted an export licensing system and 
attempted several forms of allocating the licenses F1rst the quota was 
allocated on a quarterly basis to exporters based on historical shares in 
the export business Then the quota allocation was sh1fted to a 
first-come-first-serve system where licenses were granted for the quarter 
upto the point that the quota for the period was exhausted 
Finally by the end of 1983 Tha1land had arrived at a workeable system 
for allocation of the export quota Start1ng 1n 1984 the year was d1vided 
into seven periods Export allocations in a period were based on the 
stocks held by exporters such that those holding higher stocks would be 
given a higher percentage share of the export quota In addition a bonus 
system was instHuted in which any exports to th1rd countries in the 
previous period would allow first priority to export allocation in the next 
period depending on the Sl.ze of the third country exports The bonus 
system was established on a 1 1 basis and the ratio was changed to 1 25 1 
at the end of 1985 that is a one ton quota allocatl.on for every 1 25 tons 
exported to third countries However due to the declining stock levels in 
mid-1986 the bonus ratio was changed back to 1 1 in June of that year 
The reversal indicates that the Ministry of Commerce recognizes the pol1cy 
role of the bonus ratl.o whereby market surpluses can be managed by 
adjustment in this ratio 
The result of this quota allocation system has been the development of 
a two-tiered price structure at the export point The system has allowed 
Thailand to appropriate the rents to be accrued in the European market 
while maintaining a unified domestic price structure The divergence in 
prices at the export point is due to the situation where cassava prices in 
Europe are determined by the grain price set under the Common Agricultura! 
Policy and those in th1rd countries are set by the world price for 
feedgrains As one of the results of the quota has been an increased price 
spread between Tha1land and Europe the Ministry of Commerce has developed 
l.ts export allocation policy to divert these exporter rents in arder to 
finance exports to third countries As export allocations have been as low 
as 11% of total stock holdings (Figure 8 6) there is sign1f1cant l.ncentive 
for exporters to guarantee their access to the European market by utiliz1ng 
some of these profits to sell in third countries Thailand has thus 
taken the logical step of stratl.fying its market 
On the import market side there has been a progressive liberall.zation 
of tariff and quota restrictions on cassava in most markets With the 
recogn1zed shift to dependence on imports to meet their animal feed 
requirements East Asian countries have progressively liberalizad import 
restrictions on feed components In general liberalization of feed grains 
especially maize and sorghum precedes that of cassava In Japan and South 
Korea this has been due to a vestl.gial desire to protect domestic sweet 
patato producers and in Taiwan to protect both sweet patato and cassava 
producers Nevertheless in 1968 Japan reduced its tar1ffs on cassava 
l.mports for feed use to zero In South Korea the liberalization has been 
much more recent Upto 1984 the general tariff for cassava was 407 
compared to 5% for maize -- cassava chips for alcohol manufacture were 
imported at a lower duty under a quota system In 1984 cassava tariff 
rates were reduced to 207 and in 1985 to 77 which was then equal to the 
rate on feedgrain imports Taiwan on the other hand has continued to 
maintain a low tariff rate on maize of 3% Wl.th a significantly higher rate 
for cassava Taiwan has been reluctant to liberalize the duty because of 
its own cassava producers even though domestic cassava does not go into 
animal feed concentrates 
East Asl.an markets have easily absorbed the surpluses from Thailand 
Thai exports to East and Southeast Asian markets increased from 48 thousand 
tons l.n 1982 (this was all chip exports to South Korea for alcohol 
production) to 129 thousand tons in 1983 225 thousand tons 1n 1984 and 
TABLE 8 23 
Year 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
Thailand Size and Distribution of Cassava Pellet 
Exports 1980-85 
ｄ･ｳｴｩｮ｡ｴｾｯｮ＠
Total Exports EEC East Asian Countries 
(000 t) (000 t) (000 t) 
4973 4811 o 
5954 5883 4 
7426 7331 49 
5094 4964 129 
6201 5867 225 
6616 4708 954 
Source Department of Customs Bangkok 
Note The voluntary export ｲ･ｳｴｲ｡ｾｮｴ＠ carne into effect October 1982 
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finally to 954 thousand tons in 1985 (Table 8 23) In 1985 Japan took over 
400 thousand tons and South Korea and Taiwan over 200 thousand tons each 
The potential market for cassava in East ａｳｾ｡＠ is more than even current 
cassava export levels as long as it is competitively priced with maize 
East Asia will develop as the secondary or residual market for Thai 
cassava with Europe having first call on Thai cassava exports upto the 
quota ｬｾｭｾｴ＠
On the other hand for the cassava-producing countries in Southeast 
Asia increased cassava production is one of the means for meeting the 
rapidly rising domestic demand for carbohydrate sources in feed ratwns 
(Table 8 20) Feed concentrate production has been increasing rapidly in 
most ｣ｯｵｮｴｲｾ･ｳ＠ in Southeast Asia as demand for animal products have 
increased and technical change has taken place in animal production 
systems In Malaysia and the Philippines feed component demand has been 
met to a significant extent by increased maize imports In Thailand 
increasingly maize production has been diverted to meeting domestic demand 
while exports have largely stagnated Finally in Indonesia structural 
change in ｡ｮｾｭ｡ｬ＠ and feed production is JUSt beginning and if Indonesia 
follows trends in the other countries Indonesia will also become a net 
feedgrain importer Therefore the potential exists to link increasing 
､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ demand for feed energy sources to increased cassava production 
Realization of this potential depends on cassava being price 
competitive with other carbohydrate sources in animal feed diets In Asia 
this is maize supplemented by broken rice when available Cassava ｾｳ＠
competitive if it enters into the solution of a least cost feed formulation 
model For the period 1982 to 1984 cassava enters into the least cost diet 
in Indonesia and the Philippines Cassava comes in and out of the diet in 
Thailand and does not enter at all in Malaysia To enter the diet cassava 
in general has to be priced at about 65 to 70i' of the price of maize 
depending on the price of soybean meal Viewed in the longer term this 
maize-cassava-price ratio has been very variable in ｉｮ､ｯｮ･ｳｾ｡＠ and ｔｨ｡ｾｬ｡ｮ､＠
reflecting the disarticulation between the two international markets In 
Malaysia the trends in this ｰｲｾ｣･＠ ratio have been consistently rising In 
Malaysia cassava has progressively gotten more expensive in relation to 
maize Starting in 1980 cassava began to be ｰ･ｲｩｯ､ｾ｣｡ｬｬｹ＠ uncompetitive and 
in ｭｾ､ＭＱＹＸＲ＠ this trend became relatively permanent In Indonesia on the 
other hand cassava has become relatively cheaper compared to ｭ｡ｾｺ･＠
although with significant variability 
This analysis reinforces conclusions from the previous chapters In 
Malaysia in the 1980's cassava has failed to remain ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｾｴｩｶ･＠ with maize 
imports In Thailand cassava will come in and out of the ration depending 
on price relationships for maize and cassava defined in two ｾｮ､･ｰ･ｮ､･ｮｴ＠
but nevertheless internacional markets In ｉｮ､ｯｮ･ｳｾ｡＠ cassava could form a 
more important component of the as yet nascent feed industry Cassava ｾｮ＠
some years is extremely competitive with maize and yet cassava has not been 
ｵｴｾｬｩｺ･､＠ ｾｮ＠ this industry Use in this industry could put a more ･ｦｦ･｣ｴｾｶ･＠
price floor under cassava on Java However since the feed industry has so 
far ｲ･ｬｾ･､＠ on imported ｭ｡ｾｺ･＠ through BULOG the marketing channels there 
have yet to develop In the Philippines cassava is ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｩｴｾｶ･＠ but an even 
further step is required of developing cassava processing capacity In 
general there is sufficient demand in existing ､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ markets to absorb 
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cassava production in these countries Cassava s entry into the growing 
animal feed market will apart from Tha1land depend on increased domestic 
production 
Conclus1ons 
The previous analysis suggests a rather basic question what is a 
world market for cassava? The world cassava market is something of an odd 
animal only because it presents the reverse image of the dominant world 
market for grains The distinctions here are many but a few will suff1ce 
in order to characterize the world cassava market First cassava moves as 
a semi-processed product whereas grains are essentially bulked and 
shipped being processed in the importing country Processing makes 
cassava a tradeable ｧｯｾ＠ and unlike other root crops links cassava 
producing areas to international markets However the processing defines 
the end market where it will be util1zed i e starch human food or an1mal 
feed End use in cassava is defined at or near the product1on point 
whereas in gra1ns end use is defined near the consumption po1nt The issue 
is critical in international trade because rocessed roducts e 
or lour, n general ha ve higher tariff protection than raw materials 
Thus a world cassava trade is not defined in the same sense as a world 
maize trade Rather there is a cassava starch trade and a cassava pellet 
trade each with their respective world prices 
Second government policy plays a very d1rect role in price formation 
for cassava in world markets just as in the case of grains However for 
grains world prices are principally determined by policies in maJor 
exporting countries which support the price or incomes of their grain 
producers In cassava on the other hand pr1ces are principally set by 
the pol1cies of importing countries There are virtually no policies wh1ch 
directly intervene to support e1ther farm prices for cassava or cassava 
producer incomes The distinction is important in regards to the standard 
by which cassava is judged to be price competitive with grains in 
international markets Cassava competes essentially with grains but the 
current organ1zation of international trade in cassava and grains results 
in a situat1on where they do not compete directly at internationally 
determ1ned prices Thus the common assessment that cassava is not 
competitive in international grain markets in something of a red herr:mg 
because prices are formed w1thin two very distinct policy structures and 
prices in both cases are not an adequate measure of actual production and 
transfer costs 
Finally the degree of substitut1on between cassava and grains has 
measurably increased over the post-war period and much of the growth 1n 
world trade 1n cassava has been based on cassava s d1rect subst1tut1on for 
grains in the different end markets Cassava s future in world markets 
does in fact depend on its ability to compete with grains To date this 
competition has been determ1ned by grain price pol1c1es and tariff 
structures of importing countr1es and because of this cassava trade is 
more vulnerable to policy changes than the international grain trade where 
pr1ces and volumes are principally set by the gra1n policies of the 
exporting countr1es Thus while cassava competes on a cost bas1s in the 
wider international grain market (Table 7 21) it cannot compete on a pr1ce 
basis The political economy of international trade in carbohydrate 
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sources is such that cassava which comes closest to being produced and 
traded under laissez-faire market principies and perfect competition 
economic princ1ples and furthermore which is produced solely in developing 
countries cannot compete in an international grain market where income 
support policies (and to a lesser extent export subsidies and 
government-to-government sales) of developed countries are necessary for 
producing at 1nternational prices The future of a world market for 
cassava is principally a matter of political economy and not of pure 
economics and the policy structure within which cassava must compete will 
be set outside the influence of cassava producers themselves 
Does cassava have a comparat1ve advantage vis-a-vis grains in 
international markets? The dominant world market for both grains and 
cassava in the near future is the animal feed market Cassava would move 
as pellets competing against maize and sorghum What is striking about 
current world trade in coarse grains is that trop1cal countries are net 
importers with the volume growing over time In the tropics only Thailand 
has remained a large and consistent exporter of coarse grains in the last 
decade Sudan Burma and Zimbabwe have exported smaller amounts These 
exporters essentially trade in their own regional market anad their 
comparative advantage over the large temperate exporters often rests on 
transport costs quality (white maize in Africa) and demand for bagged 
grain The temperate zone appears to have a significant comparative 
advantage over the tropics in the production and export of maize and 
sorghum Part of th1s is due to edapho-climatic conditions -- longer day 
length longer growing season better soils and reduced d1sease and pest 
pressure -- but the primary factors are agricultura! research and efficient 
transport and marketing systems For example the large investments in 
maize research in the United States since the early 1900's was responsible 
for a signif1cant rate of growth in maize yields over the post-war period 
This increased production was princ1pally directed to export markets at 
declining real prices (Figure 8 3) 
The issue then is whether tropical cassava has a comparative advantage 
against temperate grains and whether this comparative advantage can be 
further shifted towards cassava through investments in agricultura! 
research processing and marketing Cassava is perfectly adapted to 
tropical cond1tions it grows well 1n acid soild of low nutrient status 
can w1thstand periodic drought is relatively resistant to disease and pest 
attack and is very flexible in its planting and harvesting dates Its 
productivity under such cond1tions 1s unequalled by grain crops in the 
tropics Moreover cassava has a very limited research h1story with 
almost no basic research on the crop Compared to temperature grains 
research on cassava 1s in its infancy and to date there has been little 
impact on cassava productiv1ty from 1mproved technologies Average yields 
of cassava in exporting countries are far below their potent1al indicating 
significant scope to shift relative comparative advantage to cassava 1n 
the same way that tropical palm oil has gained an 1ncreased market share 
over temperate soybean oil in the last two decade 
Comparative advantage between grains and cassava (and also between 
cassava producers) will also depend on processing and marketing costs The 
development of the cassava sector in Thailand offers something of a model 
in the development of scale economies in cassava process1ng assembly and 
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transport If growth in cassava exports are to be based on small farm 
production there is an argument for basing ｾｮｩｴｾ｡ｬ＠ growth on small-scale 
processing units and achieving scale economies only at critica! production 
volumes Large-scale processing units without the production base are a 
non-starter or usually result in plantation production Something of an 
infant industry argument exists for developing an export capacity in 
cassava that is ｣ｯｭｰ･ｴｩｴｾｶ･＠ with the Thai industry where scale economies 
have already been developed Thailand because of the efficiency of its 
processing and marketing sector is fully competitive on a cost basis with 
U S coarse grains 
Sustaining the infant industry argument would call for developing a 
critica! production volume based on domestic markets In this lies the 
real future of a world cassava market since as has been stated tropical 
countries are maJor net importers of coarse grains and increased cassava 
ｰｲｯ､ｵ｣ｴｾｯｮ＠ will be directed to meeting domestic requirements ｦｾｲｳｴ＠ Any 
export surpluses will depend on the growth in domestic demand vis-a-vis the 
growth in production As has been the case in Asian cassava producing 
countries apart from Thailand production has not been able to meet rising 
demand for cassava products In this regard then improved production 
technology would provide the increases in volumes necessary to meet 
､ｯｭ･ｳｴｾ｣＠ demand and should surpluses develop would result in the cost 
reductions that allow the country to compete in international markets The 
international market for cassava products will continue to be ruled by 
trade policies technical change and shifting comparative advantage 

